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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The European Economic Community (EU) has been very active in the last 25 years promoting 
economic policies and interventions designed to transfer resources across member nations. Such 
policies are designed, implemented, and evaluated by the European Commission in Brussels.
1 The 
general rationale for these policies has been that large disparity in income per capita across countries 
and regions exists in Europe. In economic and policy circles throughout Europe, it is widely believed 
that pure market-driven mechanisms fail to close the gap in income disparities and some form of 
centralized policy intervention must be implemented to alleviate this problem. Alternatively, in the 
United States, transfer mechanisms are mostly endogenously determined by the federal fiscal system 
and market forces. Usually, whenever there is a recession in a region or state of the US, there is an 
expansion in another state or region. Tax revenues are higher in the expanding region allowing the 
federal government to transfer resources to the contracting region through federal unemployment 
benefits and other transfers. Authors such as Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) have documented these 
mechanisms providing lessons for the EU. But, the EU has taken an interventionist approach to the 
problem by setting several transfer policies through structural funds programs.
2  
Recent economic evaluations of these economic policy interventions have revealed little 
success in closing the gap of income disparities in the EU. Boldrin and Canova (2001) show that 
income disparities in the EU remain basically unchanged despite the relative large transfer programs 
                                                           
1 See the recent studies of Boldrin and Canova (2001) and Puga (2000) for descriptions of these policies 
and programs. 
 
2 Relative to the EU, the US has a much smaller disparity in per capita income levels. For example, Boldrin 
and Canova (2001) report that the ratio between the income per capita of the richest and poorest states in 
the US is less than 2 while in the EU it is more than 5. In another important dimension, the US presents 
much higher mobility of labor than the EU. The emphasis of this paper is on a transfer of initial endowment 
in income. Yet, other income support programs to specific sectors such as farmers and labor have existed 
throughout the EU. In the case of the E.U., one of the main areas of focus has been public infrastructure. 
Transfers are setup for specific public investments in certain regions of countries identified as having 
income per capita well below the average of the EU. One of the key aspects of the programs is that a 
recipient nation must co-finance the specific infrastructure project both with public and private sector 
funds. Economists understand this "additionality" principle as a simple mechanism, designed to provide 
incentives for the best use of the resources in the economy. The EU is using such mechanisms to even 
screen potential new members from Eastern Europe in a new 2001-2006 program. The main recipient 
nations from the 1990s programs have been Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The recipients of the new 
wave of transfers include Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia; see e.g. Chatterjee, Sakoulis and Turnovsky (2000). There are of course political 
reasons behind the transfer schemes as well. For example, the 1990s program is perceived as a premium for 
the poorest regions for the admission of Austria, Finland and Sweden in the union. 
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of the last 10 years. Countries and regions seem to be growing at roughly equal and constant rates, 
with the notable exception of Ireland that has been growing much faster than average. 
This paper aims to analyze the problem of one-size-fits-all transfers roughly inspired by the 
case of the EU. We construct a simple dynamic model of saving and investment. There are two 
possible forms of saving. One is in the capital market and the other is in a risky technology that 
provides a much higher average return. The probability of success of the investment in the risky 
technology, or the actuarially fair price of insurance of the risky technology is assumed to be 
increasing at decreasing rates in the level of investment, so that higher investment levels make 
insurance more costly, e.g. Gertler and Rogoff (1990). The idea of co-financing is implicit by 
assuming a marginal transfer of date-1 endowment to an individual, region or country. We consider 
several alternative economic scenarios. First, we examine a case where there is full insurance for the 
risky technology so that an investment in the risky technology yields a sure average return. This 
regards the possibility that the transfer is given to the recipient nation and there is full insurance for 
the risky investment available (possibly paid by the donating country at fair prices). We assume that 
the fair price of insurance is increasing in the level of investment in the risky technology so that scale 
has an effect on the price of insurance. Alternatively, we consider a case where there is no full 
insurance available and the individual (region or country) bears all the risk of the investment in the 
risky technology. We consider two regimes regarding capital markets: one where saving in the capital 
market is unrestricted at the given risk-free return, or perfect capital markets; and an alternative 
where the individual (region or country) faces a date-1 liquidity constraint and does not have access 
to the capital market in date-1. We also consider alternative attitudes towards risk and intertemporal 
substitution in a general framework of dynamic preferences, which separate intertemporal 
substitution from risk aversion, e.g. Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991), Weil (1989, 1991).
3 This allows us 
to consider alternative preferences towards late versus early resolution of risk and its effect on the 
endogenous variables in the presence of transfers. 
Our main result is that one-size-fits-all transfers can have very different impacts in individuals 
(countries or regions) depending upon the specific regime regarding insurance for the risky 
technology, capital markets and attitudes towards risk and intertemporal substitution in preferences. 
We show that if transfers are of the one-size-fits-all type, the results of Boldrin and Canova (2001) 
                                                           
3  Obstfeld (1994) present a recent application of this class of preferences in closed economies, and 
Giuliano and Turnovsky (2003) present an application in small open economies. See also Bianconi (2003) 
for a survey of models in discrete and continuous time.   4
are not surprising, and the growth effects of transfers can vary both qualitatively and quantitatively 
across different regimes. A literature in international trade theory and intertemporal dynamics has 
also provided frameworks where transfers, either temporary or permanent, can have permanent 
effects on allocation of resources. Examples in the international trade and intertemporal dynamics 
areas are Turenen-Red and Woodland (1988), Haaparanta (1988) and Galor and Polemarchakis 
(1987). Bhagwati (1968) is a seminal contribution on the issue of international transfers and the 
potential adverse terms of trade effects ultimately leading to loss of welfare in the recipient nation. 
Recently, Chatterjee, Sakoulis and Turnovsky (2000) provide an analysis where a transfer in 
productive government spending can have positive growth effects on the economy. The novelty of 
this paper is to consider transfer programs in a simple two-period dynamic framework with a class of 
preferences that disentangle risk aversion from intertemporal substitution and the possibility of full 
insurance for the risky technology. Here, we claim that transfer programs that treat a set of recipient 
countries or regions or individuals as homogeneous can result in very different effects of the transfer 
on growth of output, consumption, and the allocation of resources. We show that it depends upon the 
regime of insurance for the risky technology, the regime of capital markets, and attitudes towards 
intertemporal substitution and risk aversion in a proper framework that separates the two. Thus, our 
contribution is more in the spirit of an early contribution of Eaton and Gersowitz (1989) who study 
international capital transfers and their price, depending on risk factors associated with the recipient 
nation.
4  When the transfer program is provided along with full insurance for the risky investment, 
growth in consumption and output is not enhanced. When the transfer program is provided without 
full insurance, the growth effects are positive only in special cases: (i) when CRRA = 1/EIS and there 
are perfect capital markets; or (ii) when CRRA = 1/EIS £ 2 and there are liquidity constraints. When 
CRRA π 1/EIS, preferences towards early (late) versus late (early) resolution of risk have an important 
effect on the allocation of resources, and can render the effects of transfers qualitatively and 
quantitatively opposed to the case when CRRA = 1/EIS. 
In section II we present the basic model. Section III solves for the equilibrium and computes 
the qualitative effects of transfers in the alternative regimes. Section IV provides a quantitative 
evaluation of the transfers under the alternative regimes and a sensitivity analysis regarding the 
parameters of preferences. Section V concludes. 
                                                           
4 Another important literature builds on the seminal contributions of Persson and Tabellini (1996a,b). They 
follow a political-economy approach focusing on voting schemes associated with the transfers.   5
II. BASIC MODEL 
There are two periods and a single composite commodity is produced. A representative individual 
(region or country) can use the commodity to consume, to save in the capital market or to invest in a 
risky technology. In the first period, say date-1, the individual receives an exogenous endowment y, 
engages in consumption, c1, engages in investment in the risky technology, k, or saves in the capital 
market, s = y - c1 - k at the given market interest factor R>1, as in a small (open) economy.   
  In the second period, say date-2, individuals can consume c2, and receive proceeds from the 
risky investment as follows: one unit of investment in the risky technology in date-1 yields y2 units of 
the consumption good where y2 is a random variable with probability distribution 
                z with probability p (k) 
      y 2   =          ( 1 )  
               z 0 with probability 1-p (k) 
for z > z0 and the probability function p (k)≥ 0, is well-defined, with p ' >0, p '' < 0, or p is strictly 
increasing and strictly concave in date-1 investment k. The probability function p is assumed to be 
increasing in the level of investment in the risky technology capturing scale effects in the technology. 
Also, p will reflect the actuarially fair price of insurance for the risky investment, so that the larger 
the level of investment the larger the insurance costs; see e.g. Gertler and Rogoff (1990) for similar 
specifications. The individual intertemporal budget constraint is given by 
      c 1 + (c2 / R)+ k £ y  + (y2 /R)      ( 2 )  
or the present value of consumption plus investment expenditure cannot exceed the present value of 
endowment plus proceeds from risky investment. In case of imperfect capital markets, the individual 
faces a date-1 liquidity constraint given by 
         c 1 + k = y   ﬁ   s = 0         (3)  
which prevents the individual to borrow against future random income. Utility takes the special 
isoelastic form 
     U   (   c 1  , E [ c2 ] ) = { c1 
r  + b (E [ c2 
g ])
 r / g} 
1/ r              (4) 
where 1-g ≥ 0, g π 0, is the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA), (1/1-r) ≥ 0, r π 0, is the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), and bŒ[0,1) is the subjective discount factor. U is the so-
called aggregator function that separates EIS from CRRA as in Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991), Weil 
(1989, 1990). When g = r, or CRRA = 1/EIS, we obtain the usual VNM expected utility where risk 
aversion is inversely related to intertemporal substitution. In general, we define the expected growth 
of consumption and of output as   6
       g c ∫ E[c2 /c1  ] - 1 ,       (5a) 
       g y ∫ E[y2 /y  ]   - 1 .       (5b) 
  We study the general problem of the individual (or region or country) receiving a transfer in 
date-1, ∂ y > 0, and its effect on consumption, investment in the risky technology and saving as a 
function of EIS and CRRA. The general problem is studied with two regimes of insurance regarding the 
risky technology in expression (1), full insurance at actuarially fair prices and no insurance; and two 
regimes of capital markets, perfect capital markets where (3) does not hold and imperfect capital 
markets where (3) holds. 
 
III. EQUILIBRIUM UNDER ALTERNATIVE MARKET REGIMES   
We examine the equilibrium under alternative market regimes regarding the availability of capital 
markets for borrowing and lending and the availability of insurance for the risky technology. 
(i) Full Insurance with Fair Prices and Perfect Capital Markets  
The first case examined is full insurance with actuarially fair prices and perfect capital markets. Since 
there is full insurance available for the risky technology, the date-2 consumption is non-stochastic. 
The utility becomes the usual CES and risk aversion does not matter in this case. The individual 
problem becomes 
        Max     U ( c1  , c2 ) = {c1 
r  + b c2 
r }
(1/r )              (6) 
              {c 1, c2, k}  
   subject  to  c1 + (c2 / R) + k £ y  + ( {p (k) z + [1-p (k)] z0  } / R) 
with {y ≥ 0, R≥ 0, 0<z<z0 , r £1} given. The necessary first order conditions for this problem yield 
optimality conditions 
       c 2  / c1  = ( b R
 )
1/(1-r )               (7a) 
       p ' (k) (z - z0 )   =   R         (7b) 
      c 2 = R( y - c1 - k) + p (k) z + [1-p (k)] z0        (7c) 
giving solutions for the demands {c1, c2, k} as a function of the parameters {y ≥ 0, R≥ 0, 0<z<z0 , 
r£1}. The effects of a transfer as a marginal increase in y in this case are given by 
     ∂ c1 /∂ y  =  b 
1/( r-1 )R
 r/( r-1 )  / (1 + b 
1/( r-1 )R
 r/( r-1 ) ) > 0 (< 1)          (8a) 
     ∂ c2 /∂ y  =  R
  / (1 + b 
1/( r-1 )R
 r/( r-1 ) ) > 0            (8b) 
             ∂ k /∂ y  = 0                 (8c)   7
Consumption in both periods increase and investment in the technology is unchanged. The effect on 
saving is 
     ∂ s /∂ y  =  1
  / (1 + b 
1/( r-1 )R
 r/( r-1 ) ) > 0 (< 1)            (8d) 
and saving in capital markets increases as well. The price of insurance is 
       ∂ p (k) /∂ y  = 0            (8e) 
unchanged since investment in the technology is unchanged. The effects on expected growth are 
             ∂ gc /∂ y  = 0,                 (8f) 
               ∂ gy /∂ y  = - {p (k) z + [1-p (k)] z0 }/y 
2  < 0.          (8g) 
The growth of consumption is unchanged, but the growth of output decreases since second period 
output is unchanged and no additional investment in the technology occurs. Figure 1 presents the 
equilibrium in growth of consumption and investment space, {gc , k}, from equations (7a)-(7b) and 
the potential effects of a positive transfer, ∂ y >0. In this case, the equilibrium is at point A, labeled 
No Liquidity Constraint, and the effect of the transfer is null since {gc , k} are determined 
independently of each other and independently of y, i.e. a positive transfer affects date-1 and date-2 
consumption proportionally. 
(ii) Full Insurance with Fair Prices and Liquidity Constraint 
Consider the same problem (6) but with the additional liquidity constraint (3). In this case saving in 
capital markets is null, and (average) returns are received when investment is made in the technology. 
The solution of the problem (6) with the additional constraint (3) is given by 
      b p ' (k) (z - z0 ) = (c2  / c1 )
(1-r )       (9a) 
                  c2 = p (k) z + [1-p (k)] z0           (9b) 
and (3), giving solutions for the demands {c1, c2, k} as a function of the parameters {y ≥ 0, R≥ 0, 
0<z<z0 , r£1}. The effects of a transfer as a marginal increase in y in this case are given by 
    ∂ c1 /∂ y  =  {(z - z0 )[ b p ''(k) c1 - (1-r) gc
- r p '(k) ]} 
         / {(z - z0 )[ b p ''(k) c1 - (1-r) gc
- r p '(k) ] - (1-r ) gc
- r-1 } > 0         (10a) 
    ∂ c2 /∂ y  =  - p ' (k)(z - z0 ) (1-r ) gc
- r-1 / {(z - z0 )[ b p ''(k) c1 - (1-r) gc
- r p '(k) ] - (1-r ) gc
- r-1} > 0 
                          (10b) 
   ∂ k /∂ y  =  - (1-r ) gc
- r-1 / {(z - z0 )[ b p ''(k) c1 - (1-r) gc
- r p '(k) ] - (1-r ) gc
- r-1 } > 0      (10c) 
Consumption increases in the first and second periods while investment in the technology also 
increases. The saving effect is 
       ∂ s /∂ y  =  0                (10d)   8
and saving in capital markets is unchanged. The price of insurance effect is 
     ∂ p (k) /∂ y  = - p ' (k)(1-r ) gc
- r-1 / {(z - z0 )[ b p ''(k) c1 - (1-r) gc
- r p '(k) ] - (1-r ) gc
- r-1} > 0 (10e) 
and the price of insurance increases because there is more investment in the technology. The growth 
effects are 
   ∂ gc /∂ y  = (1-r )
-1 [ b p ' (k)(z - z0 )]
 r /(1- r) b p '' (k)(z - z0 ) (∂ k /∂ y ) < 0      (10f) 
   ∂ gy /∂ y  = [ {p ' (k)(z - z0 ) (∂ k /∂ y )} - {p (k) z + [1-p (k)] z0 }  ] / y 
2  ä 0.        (10g) 
The growth of consumption decreases and the growth of output is ambiguous since there is more 
investment in the technology but also more first period endowment. Figure 1 presents the equilibrium 
in growth of consumption and investment space, {gc , k}, from equations (9a)-(9b)-(3) and the effects 
of a positive transfer, ∂ y >0. In this case, the initial equilibrium is at point B, labeled Liquidity 
Constraint. The downward sloping function reflects a negative relationship between {gc , k} from the 
investment condition, (9a) as 
∂ gc /∂ k |LC,k = b p '' (k) / (1-r ) gc
- r < 0 
because from (9a), the (expected) growth in consumption is basically determined by the marginal 
effect of investment on the fair price of insurance, p '(k), assumed to be decreasing in k meaning that 
the higher the level of investment, the fair price of insurance increases at decreasing rates. The 
upward sloping function reflects a positive relationship between {gc , k} from the date-2 consumption, 
(9b), and the liquidity constraint (3) as 
∂ gc /∂ k |LC,gc = [p ' (k)(z - z0 )/c1 ] + [ {p (k) z + [1-p (k)] z0 }/c1
2] > 0 
because, in this case, from (9b), the (expected) growth in consumption is basically determined by the 
impact effect of investment on the fair price of insurance, p (k), assumed to be increasing in k 
meaning that the higher the level of investment, the fair price of insurance increases. The effect of a 
positive transfer, ∂ y  >0, is to move the equilibrium to point C, where growth of consumption 
decreases and investment in the risky technology increases. Given the liquidity constraint, an increase 
in y creates excess demand for date-1 consumption and investment, thus {c1 , k} both increase at a 
first order rate. The higher investment increases date-2 consumption because the return is the sure 
average, but the initial increase in date-1 consumption is higher because date-2 consumption 
increases at a second order rate. The growth in consumption decreases and investment increases to 
the final equilibrium at point C. It is worth noting that, given the strict concavity of the probability 
function in investment, the case of perfect capital markets at point A presents higher investment and 
lower growth of consumption relative the liquidity constraint case of points B and C. A positive   9
transfer lowers the marginal value of the liquidity constraint bringing the equilibrium closer to point 
A, from points B to C.  
(iii) No Full Insurance Available and Perfect Capital Markets  
In this case there is no full insurance with fair prices and the individual must face the risk of the 
technology. Hence risk aversion matters and utility is given in expression (4). There are perfect 
capital markets for saving. The individual problem becomes 
      Max   U ( c1  , E [c2 ] ) = { c1 
r  + b (E [ c2 
g ])
 r / g} 
1/ r = U ( c1 , c2 , k )          (11) 
           {c 1, c2, k}  
 subject  to    c1 + (c2 / R) + k £ y  + [ y2(z') / R],   z'={z , z0} 
with {y ≥ 0, R≥ 0, probability distribution of y2(z), r £1, g £1} given. The necessary first order conditions 
for this problem yield optimality conditions 
 U 1( c1  , c2, k ) - R U2( c1  , c2, k )  = 0 
ﬁ  c1
( r-1 ) = b R  [ p (k) c2 (z)
 g - (1-p (k)) c2 (z0 )
 g ]
 (r / g ) -1 [ p (k) c2 (z)
 g-1 - (1-p (k)) c2 (z0 )
 g-1 ]     
              (12a) 
 U 1( c1  , c2, k ) - U3( c1  , c2, k )  = 0 
    ﬁ  c1
( r-1 ) = ( b /g )  [ p (k) c2 (z)
 g - (1-p (k)) c2 (z0 )
 g ]
 (r / g ) -1 { p ' (k) [ c2 (z)
 g - c2 (z0 )
 g ] }   (12b) 
       c 2 (z) = R( y - c1 - k) + z          (12c) 
                     c2 (z0 ) = R( y - c1 - k) + z0          (12d) 
where U1( c1  , c2, k ) ∫ ∂ U /∂ c1 , etc. giving solutions for the demands {c1, c2 (z ), c2 (z0 ), k} as a 
function of the parameters {y ≥ 0, R≥ 0, probability distribution of y2(z), r £1, g £1}. The effects of a 
transfer as a marginal increase in y in this case are given by 
     ∂ c1 /∂ y  = ( a22 b1 - a12 b2 ) / ( a11 a22 - a12 a21 )            (13a) 
    ∂ c2 (z) /∂ y  = ∂ c2 (z0 ) /∂ y  = R {1 - [( a22 b1 - a12 b2 ) + ( a22 b1 - a12 b2 ) / ( a11 a22 - a12 a21)]}      
              (13b) 
     ∂ k /∂ y  =  ( a11 b2 - a21 b1 ) / ( a11 a22 - a12 a21)            (13c) 
where the coefficients are a11∫ U11-U13; a12∫ U13 -U33 -U12+U23; a21∫ U11 - 2 RU12 + RU12+R
2 U22; 
a22∫ U13 -RU23 -RU12+R
2 U22; b1∫ U23-U12; b2∫ R(RU22-U12); and U11( c1  , c2, k ) = ∂ 
2U /∂ c1
2, etc. 
We cannot exactly sign the effects in this case. For saving we have  
   ∂ s /∂ y  = {1 - [( a22 b1 - a12 b2 ) + ( a22 b1 - a12 b2 ) / ( a11 a22 - a12 a21)]}         (13d) 
and the price of insurance effect is, 
     ∂ p (k) /∂ y  = p ' (k)( a11 b2 - a21 b1 ) / ( a11 a22 - a12 a21 ).         (13e)   10
The expected growth effects are 
  ∂ gc /∂ y  = ( [ {[p ' (k){c2(z)
  - c2 (z0 
 )} (∂ k /∂ y )] + (∂ c2 (z) /∂ y )]c1  
      -   { [ p (k) c2 (z) - (1-p (k)) c2 (z0 )](∂ c1 /∂ y )} ) /  c1
2        (13f) 
     ∂ gy /∂ y  = [p ' (k)( z
  - z0 
 )](∂ k /∂ y )
 - [ p (k) z
  - (1-p (k)) z0 
 ] / y 
2.       (13g) 
The qualitative effects in this case are ambiguous and we shall use simple numerical simulations 
below to understand the effects of the transfer on the endogenous variables as a function of 
intertemporal substitution and risk aversion. 
(iv) No Full Insurance Available and Liquidity Constraint 
Finally, consider the same problem (11) but with the additional liquidity constraint (3). In this case 
saving in capital markets is null, and returns are possible when investment is made in the risky 
technology. The solution of the problem (11) with the additional constraint (3) is given by 
 c 1
( r-1 ) = ( b /g )  [ p (k) c2 (z)
 g - (1-p (k)) c2 (z0 )
 g ]
 (r / g ) -1 { p ' (k) [ c2 (z)
 g - c2 (z0 )
 g ] }   (14a) 
                 c2 (z) = z           (14b) 
               c 2 (z0 ) = z0            (14c) 
and (3), giving solutions for the demands {c1, c2 (z ), c2 (z0 ), k} as a function of the parameters {y ≥ 0, 
R≥ 0, probability distribution of y2(z), r £1, g £1}. The effects of a transfer as a marginal increase in 
y in this case are given by 
  ∂ c1 /∂ y  = 1 - { (1-r )( y - k) 
r - 2 / [ (1-r )( y - k) 
r - 2 - ( b /g )  [ p (k) z
 g - (1-p (k)) z0
 g ]
 (r / g ) -1 
¥ { p '' (k) [ z
 g - z0 
 g ] } - ( b /g )[( r /g ) -1] [ p (k) z
 g - (1-p (k)) z0 
 g ]
 (r / g ) -2 { p ' (k) [ z
 g - z0 
 g ] }
 2 ]}      
              (15a) 
      ∂ c2 (z) /∂ y  = ∂ c2 (z0 ) /∂ y  = 0              (15b) 
∂ k /∂ y  =  (1-r )( y - k) 
r - 2 / [ (1-r )( y - k) 
r - 2 - ( b /g )  [ p (k) z
 g - (1-p (k)) z0 
 g ]
 (r / g ) -1 
¥ { p '' (k) [ z
 g - z0 
 g ] } - ( b /g )[( r /g ) -1] [ p (k) z
 g - (1-p (k)) z0 
 g ]
 (r / g ) -2 { p ' (k) [ z
 g - z0 
 g ] }
 2 ]   
              (15c) 
Again in this case, the signs of the effects are ambiguous except for the date-2 consumption which 
does not change since it is a contingent claim on the risky technology. The saving effect is null as 
well  
                 ∂ s /∂ y  = 0,                (15d) 
and the price of insurance effect is ambiguous 
      ∂ p (k) /∂ y  = p '(k) (∂ k /∂ y ).          (15e) 
The expected growth effects are   11
 ∂ gc /∂ y  = { p ' (k)( z
  - z0 
 ) + [ p (k) z
  - (1-p (k)) z0 
 ]} (∂ k /∂ y )
 - [p (k) z
  - (1-p (k)) z0 ] / c1
2  (15f) 
     ∂ gy /∂ y  = [p ' (k)( z
  - z0 
 )](∂ k /∂ y )
 - [ p (k) z
  - (1-p (k)) z0 
 ] / y 
2 .       (15g) 
As in case (iii), given that the effects are not easily signed analytically, we resort below to some 
simple numerical evaluations of the alternative regimes. 
 
IV. QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION AND THE ROLE OF RISK AVERSION AND 
INTERTEMPORAL SUBSTITUTION   
We evaluate quantitatively the effects of the transfer programs. The specific form of the probability 
function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas with a trend, or 
     p (k) = p + h  k 
a,  aŒ (0,1), { p,h>0: 0£ p + h  k 
a £ 1, all k}    (16) 
where parameters {p,h,a} are chosen so that the probability function is well defined. The quantitative 
assessment starts by first assuming a benchmark for the set of parameters {b,  a,  z, z0 , p, h, R, y}. We 
then evaluate the equilibrium under the benchmark {b,  a,  z, z0 , p, h, R, y}, for several configurations 
of the preference parameters {r, g } regarding intertemporal substitution and risk aversion. In each 
configuration of the preference parameters and for each regime examined in section III, we evaluate 
the elasticities of endogenous variables given an exogenous transfer, where in the case of expected 
growth rates and probability of success we evaluate semi-elasticities. The elasticity of investment is 
xky ∫ (∂ k /∂ y)(y/k) so that a 1% transfer increases investment by xky %; of date-1 consumption it is 
xc1y ∫ (∂ c1 /∂ y)(y/c1); etc. The semi-elasticity of expected growth of consumption is given by xgcy ∫ 
(∂ g c /∂ y)(y), etc. Computation of quantitative elasticities allows us to properly compare results 
across regimes and parameters of risk aversion and intertemporal substitution.  
  Hence, our thought experiment is to use different values of intertemporal substitution and risk 
aversion to capture the extent to which potential differences across countries or regions or 
individuals, in terms of fundamental parameters of preferences, can affect the qualitative and 
quantitative outcomes of transfer programs. In addition, by considering the different regimes 
regarding insurance and capital markets from section III, we can capture the extent to which potential 
differences across nations regarding insurance and capital market structure affect the quantitative 
outcome of the transfer program. The benchmark set of parameter values is {b=0.995,  a=0.1,  z=2, 
z0 =0.25, p=0.0001, h=0.65, R=1.025, y=1}. This implies a low rate of time preference of 0.5%, well 
less than the given market interest rate of 2.5%. The benchmark is one where individuals (nations or 
regions) are patient relative to market opportunities to transfer consumption. The parameters for the   12
probability function reflect a plausible elasticity with respect to investment of 0.1, and yield a well-
defined probability function. The initial endowment is set at unity and the range of outputs from the 
risky technology is {2,0.25}. The range of values of {r, g } considered is {r = -1,-2,-4,-9; g = -1,-2,-
4,-9}. This yields a range of values for EIS and CRRA as {EIS = 1/2, 1/3, 1/5, 1/10; CRRA = 2, 3, 5, 10}. 
Those values are well known in the dynamic quantitative literature and have been recently discussed 
and used by Giuliano and Turnovsky (2003) in a different context. 
  Table 1 presents the results for the regime of full insurance in section III, and the cases of 
perfect capital markets (i) and liquidity constraint (ii). As mentioned, in this case risk aversion is 
irrelevant because there is no risk in the technology and we present the results for the alternative EIS. 
The results confirm the findings of Figure 1. Under perfect capital markets, all elasticities and price 
of insurance are insensitive to the EIS, except for the elasticity of capital market saving. The fair price 
of insurance is about 1/2 indicating an average return on investment of about 14% well above the 
risk-free return on the capital market of 2.5%. However, the investment level is at bliss in (7b) and it 
remains unchanged. The lower the EIS, the lower (in absolute value) the elasticity of capital market 
saving because there is less willingness to engage in capital market activity. The effect of the 
variation in EIS is fully absorbed by capital market saving without any effect on other endogenous 
variables as one would expect under perfect capital markets. The case of liquidity constraint involves 
sensitivity of the elasticities across alternative EIS. At EIS=1/2, the elasticity of investment is 
xky=1.426, of date-1 consumption xc1y=0.971, of date-2 consumption xc2y=0.109, the semi-elasticities 
of growth of output, consumption and fair price of insurance are given respectively by x *gyy= -0.950, 
x *gyy= -0.981,  x *py= 0.066, and the fair price of insurance is p (k)=0.446. As the EIS decreases, the 
elasticities of investment and date-2 consumption increase while the elasticity of date-1 consumption 
decreases. The fair price of insurance decreases as well as the semi-elasticities of growth of income 
and consumption in absolute value. Comparing the liquidity constraint case with the perfect capital 
market case, we find that the introduction of the liquidity constraint increases the elasticity of date-1 
consumption but decreases the elasticity of date-2 consumption across the spectrum of all EIS, as one 
would expect under constraints on date-1 consumption. The fair price of insurance is lower under 
liquidity constraint because the level of investment is lower in that case, e.g. Figure 1. 
  Table 2 presents the cases for the regime without full insurance of the risky technology under 
alternative intertemporal substitution and risk aversion. Panel (a) refers to the elasticity of investment 
in the risky technology, xky. The shaded diagonal areas represent cases where CRRA=1/EIS, or the   13
simple expected utility framework of Von-Neumann and Morgenstern. The first important result is 
that in the columns for EIS=1/2, xky is initially positive for CRRA=1/EIS, but it becomes negative and 
decreases as CRRA increases, or CRRA >1/EIS. The reason is that when CRRA>1/EIS, the individual 
values more risk aversion than intertemporal substitution in utility and prefers early versus late 
resolution of risk, e.g. Kreps and Porteus (1978), Epstein and Zin (1991), Weil (1990). And thus, the 
higher the risk aversion, the more the individual avoids the risky technology. This effect is confirmed 
in panels (b), (c), (d) and (e) where the elasticities for date-1 and date-2 consumption and saving are 
first negative and become positive as CRRA increases. The same effects can be observed in panels (f), 
(g), (h), (i) where the semi-elasticities of growth of output, consumption, and fair price of insurance 
are first positive for CRRA=1/EIS, and become negative as CRRA >1/EIS, while the fair price of 
insurance decreases from 0.461 when CRRA =1/EIS to 0.375 when CRRA >1/EIS. Next consider the cases 
where CRRA<1/EIS. In the rows for CRRA=2, xky is positive for CRRA=1/EIS, and decreases for CRRA 
<1/EIS. The pattern is analogous to the case CRRA >1/EIS, because investment in the risky technology 
k, is only one part of the total saving available for investment, the other part is invested in the risk-
free capital market. In panel (e), the elasticity of saving is first negative, but it is increasing in 1/EIS. 
Now, the individual values less risk aversion and more intertemporal substitution in utility and 
prefers late versus early resolution of risk. In panels (b), (c), and (d), we observe that the elasticities 
for date-1 and date-2 consumption and saving are first negative and become positive and mostly 
increasing as 1/EIS increases. In this case, there is preference for late resolution of risk and, given risk 
aversion, the saving in the risk-free market increases as CRRA <1/EIS. 
  We discuss next the specific magnitudes of the elasticities. In all panels, we note that under 
perfect capital markets, for CRRA=1/EIS increasing (that is moving along the diagonal shaded area), xky 
increases, xc1y,  xc2zy,  xc2z0y,  xsy all increase in absolute value, and xgyy,  xgcy,  xpy also increase, while 
for the fair price of insurance, p (k) decreases. As CRRA=1/EIS increases, the level of investment in the 
risky technology decreases, but it becomes more elastic when impacted by a transfer and this effect 
propagates to all other variables that depend on the second order marginal effects of the transfer. The 
only exception is the price of fair insurance that depends directly on the level of the investment in the 
risky technology and thus declines. Next, considering the cases of liquidity constraints binding, for 
CRRA=1/EIS increasing, xky decreases, xc2zy, xc2z0y, xsy are all unchanged, and xgyy,  xgcy,  xpy all decrease, 
while p (k) increases. In this case, the fair price of insurance is uniformly higher than under perfect 
capital markets. As CRRA=1/EIS increases, the level of investment in the risky technology increases   14
under liquidity constraints, but it becomes less elastic when impacted by a transfer. In this case, date-
2 consumption and saving in the capital market are unchanged and the elasticity of date-1 
consumption, xc1y, is negative but, first increases and then decreases in absolute value (hump shaped). 
This is because the transfer is split between date-1 consumption and investment, and as the transfer 
impacts the level of investment upwards, there are less resources available for date-1 consumption (a 
substitution effect) which is counter to the positive (income) effect of the additional transfer on 
consumption. Thus, the hump shape in the elasticity of date-1 consumption, xc1y, reflects the 
unbalance between those two forces. Identical effect is reflected for the semi-elasticity of expected 
growth of consumption in panel (e). 
  Regarding the regime of full insurance versus no full insurance, we note that when the transfer 
program is provided along with full insurance for the risky investment, the effect on the expected 
growth in consumption and output is not positive. With full insurance, the investment in the risky 
technology only increases when the liquidity constraint is binding for all plausible levels of 
intertemporal substitution, but the growth effect is always negative. In the absence of full insurance, 
the expected growth effect can be positive mostly when CRRA=1/EIS and we discuss it next.  
  Finally, we examine the qualitative aspects of the quantitative evaluation. Depending upon the 
values of intertemporal substitution and risk aversion, the regime regarding insurance of the risky 
technology and the regime regarding capital markets, Tables 1 and 2 show that the effects of a 
transfer to an individual, region or nation can be substantively different. In the case of no full 
insurance and perfect capital markets [Table 2, (iii)], a transfer has a positive effect on investment in 
the risky technology only when CRRA £ 1/EIS. However, it is only when CRRA=1/EIS that a transfer will 
have a positive impact upon the growth of output. This is because whenever CRRAπ1/EIS, the 
additional income from the transfer is used in consumption and saving in the capital market providing 
less for risky investment and less for the improvement of the odds of success in the risky investment. 
In the case of no full insurance and liquidity constraint [Table 2, (iv)], a transfer has a positive effect 
on investment in the risky technology mostly when CRRA £ 1/EIS, but the growth of output is only 
positive when CRRA=1/EIS £ 2. In this case, under liquidity constraint, the effect of the transfer in the 
growth of consumption is larger (in magnitude) when compared to the perfect capital market case. 
When full insurance is available for the risky technology (Table 1), the transfer does not impact 
positively upon growth of output and consumption for any values of EIS. A positive impact on 
investment in the technology only occurs when the liquidity constraint is binding. However, the level   15
of investment is higher under perfect capital markets and thus the price of insurance is higher in that 
regime as well relative to the case of liquidity constraint. 
  The evidence from Tables 1 and 2 is that a transfer program of the one-size-fits-all, to a set of 
individuals, regions or nations can have very different effects on the profiles of consumption, 
investment, saving, price of insurance and economic growth. The different impacts depend on 
differences regarding insurance for the technology, regime of capital markets and attitudes towards 
risk aversion and intertemporal substitution. Of course, we have obtained the results fixing the set of 
parameters {b,  a,  z, z0 , p, h, R, y}. Sensitivity analysis regarding those parameters may change the 
quantitative results, in particular the result that under no full insurance and liquidity constraint [Table 
2, (iv)], the semi-elasticity of expected growth of output is only positive when CRRA=1/EIS  £ 2. 
However, it does not change our main message that treating all recipient individuals, regions or 
nations as homogeneous can lead to different and diametrically opposed outcomes.  
 
V. CONCLUSION   
We present a simple dynamic model where an individual, region or country has access to a capital 
market with a risk-free return and a risky technology where the probability of payoff depends on the 
level of investment in the technology. We consider an allocation problem when there is available full 
insurance for the technology at a fair price and when there is no full insurance available. We also 
consider a regime of perfect capital markets and liquidity constraints. We compute the effects of a 
transfer of date-1 endowment under the alternative regimes and for several values of fundamental 
preference parameters regarding intertemporal substitution and risk aversion. We show that when the 
transfer program is provided along with full insurance for the risky investment, growth in 
consumption and output is not enhanced, and the investment in the risky technology only increases 
when the liquidity constraint is binding for all plausible levels of intertemporal substitution. When the 
transfer program is provided without full insurance, the resulting effects become largely sensitive to 
the parameters in preferences, intertemporal substitution and risk aversion. The growth effects are 
positive only in special cases: (i) when CRRA = 1/EIS and there are perfect capital markets; or (ii) when 
CRRA = 1/EIS £ 2 and there are liquidity constraints. When CRRA π 1/EIS, we show that preferences 
towards early (late) versus late (early) resolution of risk have an important effect on the allocation of 
resources, and can render the effects of transfers qualitatively and quantitatively opposed to the case 
when CRRA = 1/EIS.   16
  Further research extending this model to study alternative mechanism designs under 
asymmetric information is worth pursuing. 
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Table 1: Regime of Full Insurance 
 
                  (i) Full Insurance with Fair Price 
                      and Perfect Capital Markets              
  
    (ii) Full Insurance with Fair Price 
             and Liquidity Constraint 
EIS  1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10  1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10 
xky  0 0 0 0  1.426  1.985  2.907  4.512 
xc1y  0.493 0.493 0.493 0.493 0.971 0.941 0.902 0.857 
xc2y  0.493 0.493 0.493 0.493 0.109 0.152 0.221 0.341 
xsy  -4.610 -4.533 -4.472 -4.428  0  0  0  0 
x *gyy  -1.141 -1.141 -1.141 -1.141 -0.950 -0.898 -0.815 -0.677 
x *gcy  0 0 0 0  -0.981  -0.885  -0.749  -0.552 
p (k)  0.509 0.509 0.509 0.509 0.466 0.462 0.455 0.445 
x *py  0 0 0 0  0.066  0.092  0.132  0.201 
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Table 2: Regime of No Full Insurance 
 
(a) Elasticity of Investment, xky 
                  (iii) No Full Insurance 
                      and Perfect Capital Markets              
  
    (iv) No Full Insurance 
             and Liquidity Constraint 
EIS  1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10  1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10 
CRRA          
2  43.48 2.638 1.412 1.012 30.02 2.668 0.862 0.523 
3 -6.122  93.13 5.992 3.365 -55.41 26.47 4.878 2.165 
5 -8.513  -18.62  298.2 19.53 -59.70 273.1 6.870 2.428 
10  -25.17 -39.81 -87.40 2,071 -81.13 -94.91 9.687 2.528 
(b) Elasticity of Date-1 Consumption, xc1y 
EIS  1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10  1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10 
CRRA          
2  -0.144 0.875 0.889 0.886 -3.407 0.579 1.058 1.309 
3 1.089  -0.392 0.874 0.900 7.758 -5.608 -1.128 -0.115 
5 1.079  1.127  -1.036 0.840 5.242 -54.26 -2.376 -0.678 
10  1.101 1.116 1.216 -4.119 3.526 12.28 -3.267 -0.880 
(c) Elasticity of Date-2 State-z Consumption, xc2zy 
EIS  1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10  1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10 
CRRA          
2  -0.139 0.133 0.142 0.145  0 0 0 0 
3 0.178  -0.266 0.126 0.139  0  0 0 0 
5 0.171  0.199  -0.570 0.110  0  0  0 0 
10  0.175 0.194 0.248 -1.989  0 0 0 0 
(d) Elasticity of Date-2 State-z0 Consumption, xc2zoy 
EIS  1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10  1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10 
CRRA          
2  -0.599 0.586 0.639 0.664  0 0 0 0 
3 0.720  -1.094 0.526 0.586  0  0 0 0 
5 0.667  0.781  -2.254 0.439  0  0  0 0 
10  0.667 0.745 0.951 -7.663  0 0 0 0 
(e) Elasticity of Saving, xsy 
EIS  1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10 1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10 
CRRA          
2  -1.138 1.145 1.280 1.360  0 0 0 0 
3 1.273  -1.970 0.961  1.083  0  0 0 0 
5 1.135  1.341  -3.900 0.764  0  0  0 0 
10 1.115  1.250  1.602  -12.94  0 0 0 0 
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Table 2 (continued): Regime of No Full Insurance 
 
(f) Semi-Elasticity of Expected Growth of Income, x *gyy 
                  (iii) No Full Insurance 
                      and Perfect Capital Markets              
  
    (iv) No Full Insurance 
             and Liquidity Constraint 
EIS  1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10  1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10 
CRRA          
2  2.452 -0.843 -0.940 -0.971 1.509 -0.922 -1.121 -1.179 
3 -1.493  6.145 -0.558 -0.759 -5.880 1.264 -0.747 -1.035 
5 -1.583  -2.307  20.44 0.443 -5.960 23.45 -0.555 -1.016 
10  -2.556 -3.513 -6.627 134.7 -7.153 -9.265 -0.280 -1.008 
(g) Semi-Elasticity of Expected Growth of Consumption, x *gcy 
EIS  1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10  1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10 
CRRA          
2  5.315 -1.319 -1.437 -1.442 7.469 -0.540 -1.696 -2.571 
3 -2.928  11.38 -1.011 -1.330 -14.99 11.32 2.865 0.707 
5 -3.184  -4.345  34.71 0.461 -11.23  104.74  5.631 2.396 
10  -4.834 -6.333 -11.37 219.4 -9.997 -24.34 7.302 3.054 
(h) Fair Price of Insurance, p(k) 
EIS  1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10  1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10 
CRRA          
2  0.461 0.460 0.459 0.458 0.502 0.524 0.545 0.560 
3 0.441  0.440 0.439 0.438 0.492 0.525 0.554 0.573 
5 0.411  0.411  0.410 0.410 0.468 0.515 0.556 0.578 
10  0.375 0.374 0.374 0.374 0.433 0.491 0.550 0.580 
(i) Semi-Elasticity of Fair Price of Insurance, x *py 
EIS  1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10  1/2 1/3 1/5  1/10 
CRRA          
2  2.006 0.121 0.065 0.046 1.508 0.140 0.047 0.029 
3 -0.270  4.094 0.263 0.147 -2.725 1.390 0.270 0.124 
5 -0.350  -0.765  12.23 0.800 -2.795 15.06 0.382 0.140 
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